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   Contagion and immunity are topics which typically come to the fore in posterity of crisis, seldom 
during their unfolding. As the world is currently embroiled in the throes of the 2019 novel 
coronavirus disease, this study turns to a region renowned for confronting financial calamity. This 
study seeks answers to two central research questions: whether there are any symptoms of 
intra-crisis and intra-regional contagion in Latin America, and whether the sampled countries exhibit 
signs of country-level immunity to such contagion. In order to achieve this, an intra-crisis (rather 
than a pre/post-crisis) analytical framework is employed by utilizing the selective defaults observed 
during the 2001-2018 sample period to establish four distinct sovereign crisis periods which serve an 
out-of-sample crisis signal function. A least-squares dummy variable model with crisis-varying 
parameters is then regressed onto a dataset constructed out of panel data sampled from 6 countries 
(Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Peru) to estimate the determinants of sovereign bond 
spreads. The main findings derived from this exploratory exercise were: i) VIX is confirmed as a 
global contagion factor, with a possible 3 month lag; ii) the critical role played by sovereign credit 
ratings, beyond that of a proxy for macroeconomic fundamentals; iii) an intra-crisis reversal of 
fundamentals scrutiny, wherein previously relevant non-crisis solvency indicators are disregarded in 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Latin America has long been an enigmatic region plagued by recurring financial disasters. As it 
becomes the regional epicenter of the global pandemic in an already vulnerable position, sovereign 
defaults have reemerged in its wake. Contagion and resistance to it, which shall be referred to as 
“immunity”, is not merely a timely topic; it is a pressing one. Looming catastrophe urges policy 
makers, academics, and practitioners alike to deepen their understanding of how intertwined 
financial markets behave within times of distress. Although every crash is a beast of its own, history 
has a tendency to rhyme if not repeat itself. Identifying patterns which emerge from the seemingly 
chaotic is a scientific duty and what better way to garner insights than to investigate one of the, if not 
the most, financially volatile corners of the world?  
“There are four types of countries: developed, developing, Japan, and Argentina.” The 
oft-repeated words of Kuznets ring true to this very day, but it begs the question regarding the 
current state of Latin America; is it in fact developing, or does it resemble Argentina? The harsh 
lessons of the 80’s and early 2000’s may have spurred some countries to strive towards the former 
rather than the latter. This study observes the repentant reformers, who are most likely to show 
symptoms of developed immunity to crisis contagion. Given the international search for yield driven 
by the ultralow interest rate environment in Kuznets’ successful exception (Japan) and the decision 
of its Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF) to increase allocation to foreign bond holdings, 
perhaps it is time to consider turning towards this predominantly Catholic region to avoid secularly 
stagnant investments. This backdrop serves as motivation to contribute towards greater familiarity of 
the Latin American sovereign bond market in Japan, as both sides reach across the Pacific through 
initiatives such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(CPTPP or better known as TPP-11).  
This paper follows the footsteps of Edwards (1984), Hauner et al. (2010), and Beirne & 
Fratzscher (2013) while also daring to take a leap of its own, taking considerable methodological 
liberties to achieve two research objectives: i) detect symptoms of intra-crisis and intra-regional 
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contagion in Latin America and ii) search for signs of country-level immunity to contagion. While 
exploratory in nature, an ad hoc approach is developed for this exercise. Breaking with tradition 
established in previous literature, an intra-crisis rather than pre/post-crisis analytical framework is 
proposed. Sovereign crisis events experienced by neighboring countries are treated as out-of-sample 
signals to mark four crisis periods where intra-regional contagion is most likely to appear. A 
least-squares dummy variable (LSDV) model with a crisis-varying parameters mechanism is 
regressed onto a dataset constructed from six sample countries (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, 
Panama, and Peru) between 2001 and 2018 on a monthly basis. 
The main findings derived from this study were: i) the confirmation of VIX as a global contagion 
factor and the possibility of an up to 3-month lagged effect; ii) sovereign credit ratings as a core 
determinant of sovereign spreads, beyond that of a mere proxy for country fundamentals; iii) an 
intra-crisis reversal of scrutiny on macroeconomic fundamentals, focused solely on fiscal deficits; 
and iv) heterogenous country-level crisis immunity, possibly linked to the absence of regional 
contagion. 
In light of recent developments and building upon extensive literature to date, this study sets 
out to further develop understanding of and contribute research to a region which is no stranger to 
financial crises. The remainder of this paper will be structured as follows: Chapter 1 will introduce 
recent developments in both the sovereign debt universe as a whole and portfolio investment into 
emerging market sovereign bonds (with an emphasis on Latin American issuers), Chapter 2 will 
proceed to briefly account the prevailing literature to date, Chapter 3 will explain the empirical 
methodology behind the analysis as well as data and stylized facts relevant to the study, Chapter 4 
will present the empirical results and interpretations derived from it, and Chapter 6 will conclude 
with some final thoughts. 
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CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND & RELATED LITERATURE 
Section 1. BACKGROUND 
2.1.1. Sovereign Debt in Unprecedented Times 
Sovereign debt has not been immune to the havoc unleashed by the 2019 novel coronavirus 
disease and is undergoing an epochal moment. The global market for government bonds is currently 
on the cusp of reaching a historic milestone: public debt worldwide has been projected to exceed 
100% of GDP by the end of 2020. As part of the exceptional measures undertaken during these 
exceptional times, a tsunami-like wave of public debt was issued to fund emergency lifelines 
deployed by governments in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Both government debt and fiscal 
deficits during this pandemic-induced crisis are expected to roughly double the amounts seen during 
the Great Financial Crisis (GFC).  
Another exceptional development being witnessed is found in emerging markets (EM) such 
as Chile and Colombia, where central banks have begun to implement unconventional asset purchase 
programs – primarily for, but not limited to, acquiring government bonds – for the first time. EM 
quantitative easing may have been deemed adequate to maintain the financial stability of their 
respective countries, in response to the so-called sudden stop of both economic activity and foreign 
capital inflows.  
Amidst these alarming levels of gearing, concerns are mounting. Emerging and frontier 
markets (EMFM) find themselves particularly vulnerable – more so currently when compared to the 
previous crisis – as they face the triple simultaneous shocks of economic recession followed by a 
subdued recovery, record capital outflows of foreign portfolio investments, and collapsed 
commodity prices. EMFMs are ill-prepared and thus more susceptible to the ongoing COVID-19 
crisis due to higher leverage, limited policy space, and greater dependency on external borrowing 
relative to levels seen at the time of the GFC. These vulnerabilities translated into credit rating 
downgrades will in turn raise financing requirements and therefore increase refinancing costs as well 
as rollover risk. Sovereign defaults are now a reality, rather than a heightened possibility; at the time 
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of writing three defaults have already taken place: Argentina, Ecuador, and Lebanon. In order to 
prevent a wave of defaults, the IMF and the G20 have provided emergency financial assistance and 
temporarily suspended debt services and experts have urged private creditors to cooperate on a 
global debt moratorium. 
Will crisis-prone Latin America (LATAM) fare any better relative to previous episodes as it 
becomes the geographic center of the global pandemic? Its prospects are not encouraging. Pre-crisis 
output –which was continuously lagging behind the World and EM peer benchmarks for the past 
decade– will be further aggravated, as it is forecast to have the 2
nd
 most severe contraction in 
regional output in 2020 followed by a muted recovery. Indebtedness on a gross and net basis had 
also been elevated, ranking the highest among EM regions. This already present malaise seen in 
deteriorating fundamentals was similarly reflected in the seven consecutive years of negative balance 
in sovereign credit rating actions (downgrades and downward outlook revisions) leading up to the 
crisis. 8 of the 9 sovereigns with negative outlooks at the end of 2019 were subsequently 
downgraded within the next 4 months, representing approximately half of all rated economies in the 
Western Hemisphere and hence the most negatively affected region among EMs. 
Notwithstanding these grim prospects, Latin America should not be forsaken. A major caveat 
lies behind the US$51 billion of the US$83 billion IMF COVID-19 Financial Assistance being 
provided to members of the region. Chile, Colombia, and Peru – which combined represented 
US$46 billion– were the select few sufficiently qualified to access these generous sums via the 
unconditional Flexible Credit Line lending facility owing to their proven fiscal policy track record. 
Privy to the constant stream of data and research provided by their staff and member officials, could 
there be an empirical reasoning behind the decision to support these countries and which gives 





2.1.2. Serial Sinners and Redeemed Reformers in Latin America 
“More than any other region, Latin America provides an expansive historical experience on 
the contribution to economic development of foreign capital in general, and sovereign debt in 
particular.” 
Paolera and Taylor (2013) 
Latin America has long served as a microcosm of emerging capital markets, providing 
abundant data upon which academics have theoretically formulated and empirically tested the pillars 
underpinning prevailing sovereign pricing and rating models. Has this seemingly unrepentant region 
of Eichengreen and Hausmann’s (1999) “original sin” atoned for its transgressions or does it 
continue to lapse into insolvency? Whereas Argentina and Ecuador have already succumbed to 
default, the IMF approval of special credit facilities extended to Chile, Colombia, and Peru suggests 
that some countries within this region may have redeemed themselves in the eyes of investors and 
institutions via structural reform.  
Digressing briefly for a historical account, the most widely used U.S. Dollar-denominated 
sovereign bond index originated in the aftermath of the 1980’s Less-Developed-Country (LDC) 
Crisis – also known as the LATAM Sovereign Debt Crisis – as the J.P. Morgan Emerging Market 
Bond Index (EMBI), and was primarily composed of eponymously named Brady Bonds launched by 
then U.S. Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady in 1989. The highly liquid market that resulted from 
the issuance of these bonds is considered to be the starting point of the modern EM sovereign bond 
market.  
As the sovereign bond market universe has matured from an esoteric, niche sector into a 
fully-fledged asset class within 4 decades, Latin America has continued to maintain an outsized 
presence. According to the EM boutique investment manager Ashmore using Bank of International 
Settlements (BIS) data, the global sovereign bond market was equal to US$53.8 trillion or slightly 
less than half of global (corporate and sovereign) fixed income as of 2018. EMs represented 
approximately 22% of this sum while developed markets (DMs) the remaining 78%. Disaggregating 
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the US$11.8 trillion of EM sovereign bond universe further along currency lines, shows that 89% is 
denominated in local currency with the remaining 11% in foreign currency. A regional segmentation 
of government bonds on the other hand apparently shows an Asian predominance in this market but 
this is primarily due to the presence of China, which accounts for 41.5% of the entirety of EM 
sovereign bonds. When one excludes said country from the calculations, Asia and Pacific remains 
the top issuing region representing 22% of the total sovereign issuance with Latin America trailing 
closely behind with 21%. And thus, we finally arrive at our universe of interest: the US$400 billion 
Dollar-denominated Latin American sovereign bond market, which represents 34% of all EM hard 
currency-denominated government bonds.  
Considering the fact that the largest pension fund in the world, Japan’s Government Pension 
Insurance Fund or GPIF will nearly double its portfolio allocation to foreign bonds from 15% to 
25% in order to attain reasonable risk-adjusted yields, one can now appreciate how it may be enticed 
by the relatively high-yielding, hard currency sovereign bonds of Latin America. The enduring 
ultralow interest rate environment in Japan also pressures its investors to search for yields abroad. It 
is within this context that this paper seeks to guide prudent investment decisions by expanding the 
knowledge regarding this region. 
Figure 1 2018 EM local currency and foreign currency sovereign bond universe (US$ trillions) 
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Section 2. RELATED LITERATURE 
“Contagion” or “spillover” effects have been studied extensively. There is a well-established 
tradition where each successive financial crisis prompts renewed academic interest into contagion, 
resulting in bouts of research contributing to its ever-expanding body of literature. LATAM has 
played an indispensable role in determining the existence of this infectious phenomenon, which has 
been observed since at least 1988, when Doukas observed – and perhaps coined – such effects in his 
empirical study on non country-specific sovereign risk premia observed in Euro-syndicate loan 
pricing of the Big 3 (Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico). Calvo and Reinhart (1996) found signs of 
investor “herding behavior”, indications of regional rather than global contagion, and the spillover 
effect of distressed countries onto neighboring ones during the Mexican Tequila Crisis of 1994-95. 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1997) demonstrate the non-linear nature of contagion as well as the 
significant role played by shared mutual fund holdings of LATAM securities rather than a common 
bank lender (which was the case during the LATAM sovereign debt crisis of the 1980’s). 
More recently, Lizarazo (2009) made a major contribution to emerging market sovereign risk 
modeling by developing a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model which endogenously 
explains financial contagion via the wealth channel and portfolio recomposition channel by 
endowing international investors with decreasing absolute risk aversion in a multi-country borrower 
framework. By doing so, the shortcomings of the risk neutral investor assumption have been 
addressed and the empirical findings surrounding contagion have become theoretically sound. 
Beirne and Fratzscher (2013) released a key paper analyzing the influence of contagion during 
the most recent financial shock, the European Sovereign Debt Crisis of 2010-2012, and addressed 
the mispriced sovereign risk premia. Their findings for the most heavily distressed Euro-periphery 
countries at the time (Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy, and Portugal) show 2 factors to be the main 
culprits behind the spread differentials that took place: i) fundamentals contagion or a  
fundamentals “wake-up call” (heightened sensitivity to macroeconomic fundamentals) and ii) actual 
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impairment of fundamentals. Latin America was found to have passed this period unscathed and 
exhibited decreasing spreads, as evidenced by Brazil and Mexico, in contrast to other emerging 
market economies which were transmitted a 100bps spread increase via regional contagion. Negative 
crisis-specific fixed country-effects for advanced economies (the US and Germany in particular) are 
attributed to the flight-to-safety phenomenon. By defining herding contagion or “pure” contagion as 
a co-movement or time-clustering of elevated residuals, they detect spikes in proximity to 2008 and 
2011 in Europe as well as in 2000, 2002, and 2007-08 for EMs. 
Wang and Yao (2014) confirmed a positive and significant relationship between the Chicago 
Board of Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) and LATAM credit default swap spreads (CDS) both 
before and after (to a lesser degree relative to pre-crisis) the 2008 Lehman crisis in addition to 
observing a contagion of the Greek sovereign debt crisis. 
Wu et al. (2016) differentiates between same-day, “fast-and-furious” intra-regional contagion 
effects and interestingly, does not find any significance for fundamentals in determining regional risk 
for LATAM. VIX and debt-to-GDP are found to be significant global risk factors however. 
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CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY & DATA 
Section 1. METHODOLOGY 
The main empirical objectives of this paper are to i) measure the degree to which sovereign 
spreads determinants exhibit signs of contagion during recurring intra-regional crisis events in Latin 
America and ii) identify indications of crisis “immunity” among the non-defaulting countries. 
As a prerequisite, it is necessary to first define two key concepts: sovereign crisis events and 
contagion. The former will be defined as the time period during which a neighboring LATAM 
sovereign to our sample countries had been in selective default on their external US hard currency 
debt obligations according to rating agency S&P Global. Meanwhile, the latter shall be understood 
as the statistically significant estimated effect of fundamentals contagion (heightened sensitivity to 
conventional sovereign solvency metrics), regional contagion (increased spillover of regional risk), 
and global contagion factors (international investors’ risk aversion or flight to safety) on sampled 
sovereign yield spreads during the previously mentioned default episodes. 
While the prevailing literature has tended to produce pre and post-crisis analyses on major 
financial disasters (Beirne and Fratzscher, 2014; Wang and Yao, 2014; Cayon et al., 2018), this study 
opts to employ an intra-crisis analytical framework by utilizing a tailored crisis event approach in 
order to better capture intra-regional contagion effects as well as country-level heterogeneity of 
sovereign risk pricing. Despite LATAM’s propensity for fiscal turmoil being widely understood as a 
structural characteristic of this region – a reputation built over the span of over two centuries – 
investors have been able to better distinguish between the loan worthy from the rest after each 
successive crisis (Paolera and Taylor, 2014). However, is this differential treatment observed during 
the potential unfolding of regional crisis or do markets fall prey to irrational panic and retreat 
indiscriminately?  
Hence, a crisis dummy variable set to activate strictly in the event of an actual default of a 
non-sample LATAM sovereign is deemed appropriate. An out-of-sample crisis signal can be 
understood as the representation of an intra-regional yet exogenous shock, which addresses the 
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endogeneity issue. A possible advantage to observing spread movements in this manner is the 
possibility to bridge the gap between the short-run event study and long-run regression 
methodologies to capture short-term and long-term crisis contagion mechanisms at work. Another 
feature of this method is the exclusion of possible statistical noise that may be included when 
utilizing high-volatility events unrelated to default uncertainty as a signal. 
An additional modification made to the standard ordinary least squares (OLS) country 
fixed-effects panel regressions seen in the literature is the decision to i) explicitly model the 
individual country fixed-effect in the regression formula as a factor variable via least-squares 
dummy variable or LSDV model and ii) use average LATAM metrics as a common intercept to 
circumvent the dropped variable problem, so as to clearly and accurately detect both intra-crisis and 
non-crisis country risk premiums relative to a regional benchmark. 
The standard formulation for determining sovereign yields is composed of a combination of 
credit risk, liquidity risk, and risk appetite. It is written as follows (Beirne and Fratzscher, 2013): 
 r𝑡 = (1 − 𝑃(𝑋𝑡))(1 − 𝜇𝑡) + Ω𝑡 + Φ𝑡 ( 1 ) 
 
wherein r𝑡 represents the sovereign yield of the risk-free asset issued by the sovereign in question, 
(1 − 𝑃(𝑋𝑡)) is equal to the probability of default of the issuer given a set of relevant sovereign 
solvency fundamentals X, (1 − 𝜇𝑡) is the expected loss in the event of default, Ω𝑡 is the risk 
premia, and Φ𝑡 the liquidity premium, all at time t. To clarify, credit risk is being expressed as 
(1 − 𝑃(𝑋𝑡))(1 − 𝜇𝑡) or the expected credit loss given default.  
It was Edwards (1984) who initially formalized the relationship between the probability of 
default as and the spread of a Eurodollar sovereign loan to a less developed country sovereign as: 
 log 𝑠 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑥𝑖 + log 𝛾 
( 2 ) 
where s is the sovereign spread, 𝛼𝑖 is the country fixed effect, 𝑥𝑖 is a set of perceived determinants 
of default, and 𝛾 a variable absorbing other elements which explained s. 
In their study of differential treatment of sovereign risk for the European Union’s latest 










+ 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ( 3 ) 
 
where s represented sovereign currency spreads of country i at time t, 𝛼𝑖 country fixed effects, 𝛽𝑘 
and 𝛾𝑙  coefficients for country/period-specific solvency indicators 𝑋𝑘𝑖𝑡  and period-specific 
controls 𝑍𝑙𝑡, and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 the error term. 
Formally, the linear country fixed-effects model utilized is the approach developed by Beirne 
and Fratzscher (2013), which extends the standardized approach following the tradition of Edwards 
(1984) and Hauner et al. (2010) above, to allow for crisis-specific parameters: 
 log 𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑆𝑡 + (𝛿0 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑆𝑡)𝐷𝑡
𝐶 + 𝑖,𝑡 ( 4 ) 
 
The model can be decomposed into three main expressions: 𝛼0 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑆𝑡 , which 
estimates non-crisis parameters for the entire sample period; (𝛿0 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑆𝑡)𝐷𝑡
𝐶, which 
absorbs intra-crisis country, fundamentals, and regional coefficients during sovereign crisis events; 
and 𝑖,𝑡, the serially uncorrelated residual. 𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is the sovereign spread, 𝑆𝑡 the LATAM unweighted 
average regional spread in logs excluding 𝑠𝑖,𝑡 , and 𝑋𝑖,𝑡  is the set of relevant fiscal solvency 
fundamentals, for country i at time t. 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is in turn comprised of four macroeconomic variables 
which are considered to be fundamental determinants of default risk: gross public debt to GDP ratio, 
fiscal balance or net fiscal borrowing to GDP ratio, annualized rate of real GDP growth, and current 
account balance to GDP growth of the country in question. VIX is incorporated as a global 
systematic risk factor proxy within this set. To confirm whether sovereign credit ratings held any 
explanatory power and for its potential to enhance the original model, it is also incorporated into the 
fundamentals set in posterior analysis. 
Whereas intra-crisis fundamentals coefficient 𝛽2  and regional risk coefficients 𝛾2  both 
measure fundamentals “wake-up call” contagion and regional spillover effects contagion, 
respectively, intra-crisis country fixed effects parameter 𝛿𝑖 will represent a country-level immunity 
to crisis contagion attributable to the issuing sovereign such as, but not limited to, their (in)adequate 
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crisis response record or reputational endowments of past crisis management. 𝛼𝑖 is the country 
fixed-effects coefficient specific to country i, which may be understood as a proxy for 
institutionalized (im)proper non-crisis fiscal behavior. 𝐷𝑡
𝐶 is the sovereign crisis event dummy 
variable set to 1 in periods of an ongoing selective default in LATAM during the sample period and 0 
when otherwise. As the model is run on an OLS regression with country factors against a common 
intercept, the estimated parameters are all relative values in comparison to LATAM regional figures, 
except for 𝑆𝑡, which is substituted with a constructed average of developing market regional EMBI+ 
spreads not including LATAM. In the posterior inclusion of sovereign credit ratings as an 
explanatory variable, it is substituted with the average S&P Foreign Long-Term Issuer credit rating 
of 10 LATAM sovereigns: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
Summary statistics and the LSDV regression were obtained by programming in the R 





Section 2. DATA & STYLIZED FACTS 
LATAM is neither monolithic nor irredeemable. One can clearly identify three outliers in 
Figure 2: Argentina, Ecuador, and Venezuela. The explanation behind these surges is 
straightforward; these countries and Uruguay – an exception among the outliers, as its sovereign 
spread did not experience a similar spike, perhaps due to its amicably negotiated debt restructuring 
overseen by a supportive United States – all defaulted on their obligations within the past two 
decades at different points in time. Such failures have overshadowed the steady progress in 
creditworthiness made by non-defaulters throughout the very same period as seen in Figure 3. 
Nevertheless, note the comovements in October 2002, October 2008, and in March 2016. Were these 
merely synchronized instances of fundamentals deterioration or heightened stringency towards 
them?  





































































































































































Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia
Ecuador Mexico Panama Peru




Source: World Bank Global Economic Monitor Database, JPMorgan EMBI+ 
S&P Foreign Long-term Issuer Ratings (complemented with Fitch ratings where 
necessary) for selected Latin American countries (see Table 1) were acquired via Thompson Reuters 
Eikon to garner insights from the historical evolution of their credit ratings. There are four key 
observations worth highlighting in Figure 3. First is Chile’s envious position among its peers, the 
only country to rank within the A-tier and above. Second is Brazil’s downgrades towards the end of 
the period, not only plunging below investment grade but also below the benchmark Latin America 
average. Third is Uruguay’s rapid recovery to investment grade status in less than 7 years. Finally, 
note the yawning gap between the average ratings of Reformers and Defaulters; the difference 
between these two groups more than quadrupled, starting from a 1.5-notch differential in 2001 and 
ending with 6.5 notches by the end of 2018. 
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Figure 3: Evolution of Long-Term Issuer Ratings for Selected Latin American countries, 2001-2018 
 
Source: S&P Global Ratings 
The crucial decision behind sample selection was a combination of the observations mentioned 
above, availability of data, and relevance to our empirical objectives. Despite the tendency for Latin 
American sovereigns to often be found grouped along with their Caribbean brethren, this study 
chooses to omit them. This is due to their categorical difference and the potential for significant bias 
in the results, as Caribbean nations exhibit weaker fundamentals and higher spreads on average. 
Table 1 Selected sample of Latin American sovereigns 









































Sample period selection was based on the availability of accessible sovereign bond spreads, 
obtained from the World Bank’s Global Economic Monitor database. These spreads are calculated 
upon a sovereign’s inclusion into JP Morgan’s Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI+). January 
2001 was determined to be an appropriate starting point to capture the South American crisis of 2002 
which was in turn triggered by the Argentinean collapse of 2001. December 2018 was the limit to the 
interpolation of 2018-19 fundamentals. Macroeconomic fundamentals were acquired from the IMF 
World Economic Outlook Database of October 2019 due to its comprehensiveness over the 2020 
April edition. Data for the four macroeconomic country fundamentals (Debt-to-GDP, real annual 
GDP growth, fiscal balance to GDP ratio, and the current account balance to GDP ratio) were all 
provided on a yearly basis and therefore standard interpolation was applied in accordance with the 
literature (Hauner et al., 2010; Beirne and Fratzscher, 2013) to obtain monthly figures. The monthly 
changes in VIX were sourced from Thomson Reuters Eikon. Dates for LATAM sovereign selective 
defaults (Table 3) on foreign currency bonds were obtained from the 2019 S&P Global Annual 
Sovereign Default and Rating Transition Study.   
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Table 2 Summary statistics of main variables 
   
Non-Crisis Intra-Crisis 
 














 mean 284 139 228 206 205 217 393 590 155 385 262 291 328 615 
 max 1163 353 726 459 526 763 1112 2057 383 986 463 574 816 1205 
 min 143 55 108 98 121 104 165 212 61 146 163 102 122 336 










 mean 67 11 39 44 42 27 50 75 15 46 47 49 35 56 
 max 86 25 53 55 60 86 66 89 28 54 57 61 49 70 
 min 60 4 32 37 34 20 46 64 6 35 38 37 22 48 














 mean 3.1 3.9 4.3 2.2 7.2 5.6 3.0 1.2 3.7 3.5 1.9 5.0 4.3 1.9 
 max 7.3 6.3 7.1 5.0 11.9 9.1 6.0 5.6 7.1 5.7 3.8 7.8 6.9 6.0 
 min -1.4 -0.8 1.4 -4.3 0.7 1.0 -1.1 -3.5 -1.2 1.4 -4.8 1.6 1.6 -1.5 

















 mean -2.0 -0.8 -3.0 -1.4 -8.1 -2.0 -1.4 -0.5 -0.3 -2.7 -1.4 -6.0 -1.5 -0.7 
 max 1.3 4.6 -1.1 -0.4 -0.9 3.2 1.6 1.7 3.0 -0.7 -0.6 -0.8 2.4 1.5 
 min -4.1 -4.0 -5.7 -2.4 -13.0 -5.1 -3.1 -3.5 -3.4 -6.2 -2.6 -11.0 -4.9 -3.2 















 mean -3.9 1.2 -1.6 -2.7 -1.1 0.6 -3.0 -5.9 -0.4 -2.2 -2.5 -2.8 -1.4 -3.6 
 max -1.6 7.9 0.0 -0.8 3.0 3.3 -0.8 -2.9 5.9 -0.1 -1.4 -0.8 0.7 -1.1 
 min -8.5 -3.0 -3.3 -4.5 -3.1 -2.9 -5.7 -10.2 -3.9 -3.4 -4.3 -4.5 -2.5 -6.5 















 mean 479 465 456 459 459 457 342** 884 861 841 852 849 845 484** 
 max 1129 1082 1068 1075 1070 1073 955** 1444 1500 1435 1485 1475 1446 979** 
 min 207 202 197 200 197 199 160** 375 364 362 361 360 362 282** 










 mean 2 2 
 max 91 135 
 min -32 -38 
 st.dev 20 25 
*Latin American sovereign spreads were included as a common intercept 
**Regional spreads were constructed as an unweighted average of EMBI+ regional sovereign spreads 






Table 3 Selective defaults of selected Latin American countries between 2001-2018 
Sov. Crisis Period Country Default date Emergence date Time in default 
I 
Argentina I Nov. 2001 Jun. 2005 54 months 
Paraguay Feb. 2003 Jul. 2004 18 months 
Uruguay May. 2003 Jun. 2003 1 month 
Venezuela I Jan. 2005 Mar. 2005 1 month 
II Ecuador Dec. 2008 Jun. 2009 6 months 
III Argentina II Jul. 2014 May. 2016 22 months 
IV Venezuela II Nov. 2017 Ongoing 14 months* 
Total duration of sovereign crisis events 96 months** 
Share of total sample period 44.4% 
Source: S&P Global Ratings 
*Considering the end date of our sample period, the time in default would roughly equal 14 months 
between November 13, 2017 and December 31, 2018.  
**Due to the overlapping periods between Argentina’s 1
st
 default and those of Paraguay, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela’s 1
st
 default, only Argentina’s is considered in the calculation of total time in default. 
3.2.1. VIX as a leading indicator 
An unconventional decision was made to lag the VIX by 3 months when performing 
regression analysis. Initial attempts encountered an unintuitive and unjustifiable result: a negative 
estimation for the VIX coefficient during crisis events. Therefore, a test regression with no lag, 
1-month, 2-month, and 3-month lag on the VIX variable were compared. Regression results from R 
Studio are presented in Figure 4 alongside graph for visual reference in Figure 5. 
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Source: Thompson Reuters Eikon, World Bank Global Economic Monitor, JPMorgan EMBI+ 
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CHAPTER 4. FINDINGS & INTERPRETATION 
Section 1. AN INITIAL AD HOC LSDV REGRESSION 
The result of our country fixed effects panel linear regression with cluster robust standard errors 
are presented in Table 4. The parameters are presented in relation to sovereign spread basis points for 
ease of interpretation and relative to a common intercept of average LATAM figures. 
Beginning with the non-crisis country fixed effects 𝛼𝑖 , which in this exercise is the 
country-specific risk disparity relative to LATAM spreads, we can observe an interesting finding. 
Contrary to what each country’s respective credit rating may suggest, it is Brazil who has the highest 
negative coefficient. This runs counter to what one could expect and implies that Brazil is enjoying 
an exceptionally lower country risk premium among its peers. 
Next, we address the lack of significance for all non-crisis fundamental variables save for the 
debt to GDP ratio (DTG). This result is suspected to be a consequence of utilizing the LATAM 
benchmark as a common intercept. Fundamentals for each of the sampled countries, except for DTG, 
do not deviate substantially from regional means and therefore cannot pass the hypothesis test. It 
must be clarified that these results do not invalidate the previous literature which confirms the 
fundamentals as determinants of risk pricing. Instead, it suggests that when trying to explain the 
spread differential between the sampled countries and Latin America during a non-crisis 
environment, one should prioritize DTG over other solvency metrics. The regression indicates that 
over the span of nearly two decades, a nominal 1% rise in gross public debt resulted in a 1.8% rise in 
spreads. While relevant solvency indicators should always be taken into account when conducting an 
analysis on Latin American sovereign bonds, it appears that DTG merits particular emphasis over the 
others. 
Non-crisis regional spreads are both significant and considerable. As regional spreads have also 
been log transformed for ease of interpretation, a 1% rise in regional bond spreads leads to a 0.57% 
rise in sovereign spreads during normal economic conditions. This finding also deserves a more 
detailed explanation as the LATAM benchmark used as an intercept substitutes the LATAM regional 
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spreads excluding the sovereign i in the regression formula with regional developing economies’ 
average EMBI+ spreads excluding the LATAM region. Thus, this is a relative measure of change 
between the sample sovereigns’ spreads and the region average versus the change in LATAM’s 
regional sovereign spreads relative to other developing market regions. The magnitude suggests a 
prominent role played by LATAM regional spreads when compared to country-specific DTG in 
explaining sovereign spreads. This result is quite similar to and in line with Beirne and Fratzscher’s 
(2013) findings for Emerging Market Economies. Wu et al. (2016) attributed relatively higher 
regional integration of sovereign credit markets to intra-regional contagion in LATAM and one may 
reasonably expect this cross-country transmission channel to be present during non-crisis times as 
well.  
Turning to the crisis estimations, we first note the negative crisis constant which is of a higher 
magnitude than the non-crisis constant, albeit at a reduced 90% significance level. In effect, this may 
indicate that intra-crisis spreads of the sampled countries have a priced in risk “discount” in 
comparison to LATAM spreads, as they exhibit a negative constant when adding both the 𝛼0 and 
𝛿0. One can interpret this as markets already pricing in a crisis “immunity” of sorts, as this negative 
coefficient is present before taking into consideration other variables of the regression including the 
country fixed effects. The alternative technical and more probable explanation is that this is merely 
an unobserved fixed effect or an omitted variable bias.  
Note the considerable difference in both magnitude and significance among the 𝛿𝑖 estimations, 
especially when compared to their corresponding 𝛼𝑖. These results are unsurprising and in line with 
expectations based on the evolution of the sample countries’ respective credit ratings. Brazil on 
average had a below investment grade rating (S&P BBB-) equivalent to BB+ during the entire 
sample period, being the only country to be downgraded during all but one of the sovereign crisis 
events. Colombia’s crisis-state country fixed effect is also found to be insignificant despite its 
consistent rating upgrades throughout the years, although admittedly it was downgraded in the last 
crisis event. The issuer rating argument appears to be equally valid in explaining the degree and 
significance of Chile, Mexico, Panama, and Peru’s crisis-state country fixed effects. Panama is an 
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outlier in this regard as its magnitude is the second highest, despite Mexico achieving investment 
grade status earlier and maintaining a higher status on average throughout. Wu et al. (2016) 
corroborates this interpretation through their findings on the significant effect of sovereign rating 
changes on regional risk factors. 
Moving on to crisis fundamentals, wherein one would theoretically observe indications of 
fundamentals contagion, significance can only be appreciated for the fiscal balance to GDP ratio 
(FBG). The coefficient sign for it is negative, as expected, where a 1% increase in the fiscal deficit 
increases sovereign spreads by 7.4%. Again, these estimations must be interpreted in relation to 
intra-crisis LATAM average fundamentals. These results are somewhat validated by Wu (2016), who 
also failed to find any significance for economic fundamentals in LATAM, stating that market 
participants may be wholly disregarding these indicators due to the region’s disreputable history.  
A positive and significant VIX is in accordance with the literature, corroborated by Beirne and 
Fratzscher (2013), Wang and Yao (2014), and Wu et al. (2016). Its magnitude may suggest a slight 
economic significance, but one must remember the extremely highly volatile nature of VIX in 
distressing times. If a 1% rise of a monthly change in VIX equals a .1% rise in sovereign spreads, the 
maximum 135% reached in the intra-crisis period would be equivalent to a 13.5% increase.  
Intra-crisis regional spreads are found to be significant, although to a lesser degree when 
compared to its non-crisis state. Nevertheless, due to the additive nature of the regression formula, a 
1% increase in regional spreads during a crisis event would roughly equal a 1% rise in spreads, or a 
1:1 transmission. This finding is also confirmed by Wu et al. (2016), who detected intra-regional 
contagion to be particularly strong in LATAM. 
 Despite the various deviations from Beirne and Fratszcher’s methodology, the 0.78 adjusted 
R-squared with a joint significance at the 99% level seems to suggest that this initial ad hoc 
approach utilized in this paper may have some merit to it. Notwithstanding, to better argue in favor 
of the relevance of sovereign credit ratings as an explanatory factor behind these initial results, this 
paper proceeds to incorporate them as part of the macroeconomic fundamentals set to empirically 






Section 2. INCORPORATING SOVEREIGN CREDIT RATINGS 
This section will analyze the regression results obtained after the inclusion of sovereign credit 
ratings (SCR) and interpret the deviations from the original model.  
In the previous section, we considered the possibility that 𝛼0 and 𝛿0 were simply capturing 
unobserved fixed effects. Their new estimations seem to indicate that indeed there was a missing 
variable and it just so happened to be the SCR. Significance and magnitude for both parameters are 
drastically reduced. It should be reiterated that SCRs were assigned numerically from 1 (AAA+) to 
20 (SD or selective default), a standard practice found in the literature. Therefore, the interpretation 
of the SCR’s own non-crisis parameter implies an average 18.3% increase in sovereign spreads for a 
1 notch downgrade (e.g. from AAA+ to AAA) due to the ascending numeration. Due to the marginal 
nature of the crisis estimation, in times of crisis, the downgrade effect would be reduced to an 8.3% 
increase in spreads. 
Surprisingly, fundamentals are dramatically enhanced as real GDP growth (RGG) and the current 
account to GDP ratio (CAG) gain relevance in a statistical and economic sense, at the slight expense 
of DTG and regional bond spreads (RBS). Coefficient signs are as expected. It appears that 
fundamentals still play a critical role in determining sovereign risk and should not so be hastily 
disregarded. This may also suggest that SCRs have an influence on spreads beyond that of a mere 
proxy for fundamentals as this would have had the opposite effect. Since the majority of sampled 
countries are investment grade on average, there is a possibility that this too may be a factor to 
consider and that its inclusion may in fact be accounting for it indirectly.  
Non-country fixed effects (CFE) 𝛼𝑖 maintain their significance, implying that neither SCRs, 
fundamentals nor regional integration can explain the country-specific risk discount. Chile exhibits 
an unexpected reversal suggesting that it is being assigned a risk premium during tranquil market 
conditions. Mexico had its CFE effectively halved in contrast to Brazil which maintains its 
exceptionally high CFE, which cannot be controlled for by the explanatory variables.  
Crisis CFEs or sovereign risk immunity remains in place and relatively unchanged after 
controlling for creditworthiness. Regional risk contagion, however, vanishes implying that the 
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sampled countries are priced individually or relatively unaffected to developments in the region. 
Contrary to Beirne and Fratzscher (2013), there is no indication of a fundamentals “wake-up call”, 
supporting Wu et al.’s (2016) findings instead. Fiscal balance to GDP (FBG), which just so happened 
to be the only insignificant non-crisis variable, becomes the sole price-determinant fundamental in 
crisis periods.  
The model has been improved upon overall as evidenced by the increase in adjusted R-squared to 







Table 4 Summary table of LSDV panel regression with a common LATAM intercept  
 Original Regression Regression w/ Issuer Ratings 
Non-crisis BRA CHL COL MEX PAN PER BRA CHL COL MEX PAN PER 
Constant 1.812** 0.216 
CFE -0.9*** -0.6*** -0.5*** -0.7*** -0.5*** -0.4*** -0.7*** 0.4** -0.5*** -0.3*** -0.5*** -0.3** 
SCR - 0.183*** 
DTG 0.018** 0.010** 
RGG -0.014 -0.047*** 
∆CAG 0.02 -0.024*** 
∆FBG 0.007 -0.0004 
∆VIX 0.0003 0.0001 
RBS 0.572*** 0.563*** 
Crisis BRA CHL COL MEX PAN PER BRA CHL COL MEX PAN PER 
Constant -2.317* -0.369 
CFE -0.2 -0.9** -0.4 -0.5*** -0.7** -0.6* -0.3 -1.4*** -0.3 -0.6*** -0.5* -0.5** 
SCR - -0.102** 
DTG -0.010 -0.006 
RGG 0.025 0.034 
∆CAG -0.007 0.017 
∆FBG -0.074** -0.062* 
∆VIX 0.001*** 0.001*** 
RBS 0.435* 0.272 
Adj.R-sq 0.78 0.825 
F-stat 232.223*** 261.241*** 
Note that ***, **, * indicate an estimation is statistically significant at the 99%, 95%, and 90% level. 
CFE coefficients have been rounded to 1 digit for spacing reasons. Source dataset and regression 







CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 
This paper sought to identify indications of country-level crisis immunity and intra-regional 
contagion through an empirical examination on determinants of sovereign spreads by following the 
methodological tradition of Edwards (1984), Hauner et. al (2010) and Beirne & Fratzscher (2013). 
While the previous literature has predominantly performed pre-crisis and post-crisis analysis, this 
paper proposes an intra-crisis framework whereby the characteristic proclivity of financial crises in 
Latin America is harnessed by utilizing four distinct intra-regional sovereign crisis periods between 
2001 and 2018 as out-of-sample exogenous signals. A least-squares dummy variable model is 
regressed with a regional benchmark as a common intercept to estimate country-level heterogeneity 
within this region. 
In this exploratory exercise, we find that i) VIX may potentially be a leading indicator by up 
to 3 months with regards to the sampled countries’ spreads, ii) sovereign credit ratings are not 
merely a proxy for the issuer’s solvency indicators but a key determinant of sovereign spreads unto 
itself, iii) an intra-crisis prioritization of fiscal deficits in lieu of other fundamentals, and iv) signs of 
country-level immunity or a sovereign risk discount as well as a lack of regional contagion. 
Future research endeavors should seek to address the shortcomings or most debatable aspects 
of this paper such as, but not limited to, confirming the validity of the 3-month lagged effect of the 
VIX, the perplexing non-crisis country fixed effects for Brazil and Chile, and the possible existence 
of an investment grade effect. As the data is predominantly based on hard currency denominated 
bonds, it is suggested to explore local currency data given their current predominance in the market. 
Any usage, refinement, or correction of the ad hoc approach developed in this paper is most 
welcome. Its application, either partial, modified or whole, to other regions is also encouraged in 
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